

Measuring Severity in Statistical Inference

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1 Introduction: *modus tollens* in statistical inference.

Statistical inference mimics the logical form

$$x \text{ (data)} \rightarrow \Theta \text{ (claim)}.$$

The degree of warrant one may accord to the claim depends on the data and the strength of the “ \rightarrow ” relation. **Severity** [3, 2] concerns the measurement of strength in its contrapositive:

$$\neg\Theta \rightarrow \neg x.$$

2 Severity in binary classification.

A classifier T aims to discern between the following two assertions:

$$\Theta_- : \text{patient } x \text{ is healthy,} \quad \text{vs.} \quad \Theta_+ : \text{patient } x \text{ is ill.}$$

The severity of a positive (ill) diagnosis is

$$W(\Theta_+; T(x) = \Theta_+) = \inf_{x \in \Theta_-} P_x(X \in \Theta_-) = Pr(X \in \Theta_- | x \in \Theta_-) = \text{Specificity}(T).$$

The severity of a negative (healthy) diagnosis is

$$W(\Theta_-; T(x) = \Theta_-) = \inf_{x \in \Theta_+} P_x(X \in \Theta_+) = Pr(X \in \Theta_+ | x \in \Theta_+) = \text{Sensitivity}(T).$$

3 Definitions.

Definition 3.1 (inferential procedure). Let $x \in \mathcal{X}$ be the observable data, and $\{\Theta_0, \Theta_1\}$ be a partition of Θ . The function $T: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{\Theta_0, \Theta_1\}$ is a (binary) *inferential procedure* based on x , where

$$T(x) = \begin{cases} \Theta_1 & \text{if } x \in C_1, \\ \Theta_0 & \text{if } x \in C_0, \end{cases} \quad (3.1)$$

where the *critical regions* $\mathbf{C} = \{C_1, C_0\}$ partition \mathcal{X} .

Definition 3.2 (inferential strategy). Suppose for every $a \in \mathcal{A}$, $\mathbf{C}_a = \{C_1(a), C_0(a)\}$ is a partition of \mathcal{X} such that for $a, a' \in \mathcal{A}$ where $a < a'$, $C_1(a) \subseteq C_1(a')$. Then, the collection of inferential procedures

$$\mathcal{T} = \{T_a: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{\Theta_0, \Theta_1\}, a \in \mathcal{A}\}$$

is an *inferential strategy*, where each T_a is an inferential procedure accompanied by \mathbf{C}_a .

Definition 3.3 (warrant and severity). The *warrant* accorded to an assertion $\Theta \subseteq \Theta$ by the data x through an inferential procedure $T \in \mathcal{T}$, is

$$W(\Theta; T(x) = \Theta_i) = \inf_{\theta \notin \Theta} P_\theta(X \notin C_i^x), \quad i=0,1, \quad (3.2)$$

where $X \sim P_\theta$, $\theta \in \Theta$, and

$$C_i^x = \bigcap_{a \in \mathcal{A}: T_a \in \mathcal{T}, T_a(x) = \Theta_i} C_i(a) \quad (3.3)$$

is the *attained critical region* for Θ_i by \mathcal{T} . Furthermore,

$$W(\Theta = \Theta_i; T(x) = \Theta_i)$$

is termed the *severity* with which Θ_i is inferred by $T \in \mathcal{T}$ based on x .

Remark 3.1. *Modus tollens:*

- $X \notin C_i^x$: hypothetical or future realization of X results in an inferential claim that is the opposite of the one drawn from the current evidence x ;
- $\theta \notin \Theta$: as the parameter varies in the range that is complement to Θ .

Remark 3.2. $X \sim P_\theta$:

- (*Frequentist*) sampling distribution indexed by $\theta \in \Theta$;
- (*Bayes*) conditional prior or posterior predictive distribution marginalized over nuisance parameters.

4 Properties.

A measure of evidential support should satisfy (see [4]):

- *Coherence*: the larger the hypothesis is, the more support there is;
- *Informativeness*: the farther into the hypothesis the data are, the more support there is.

Theorem 4.1 (coherence). For fixed $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and a pair of assertions $\Theta, \tilde{\Theta} \subseteq \Theta$ satisfying $\Theta \subseteq \tilde{\Theta}$,

$$W(\Theta; T(x) = \Theta_i) \leq W(\tilde{\Theta}; T(x) = \Theta_i) \quad (4.1)$$

for $i \in \{0, 1\}$.

Definition 4.1 (data informativeness). Let $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$, and \mathcal{T} be an inferential strategy whose procedures are indexed by \mathcal{A} . Say that x is *more informative* than x' about Θ_i with respect to \mathcal{T} , if there exists some $a \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $T_a(x) = \Theta_i$ and $T_a(x') = \overline{\Theta}_i$, for $i = 0, 1$.

In words, x is more informative about a conclusion Θ_i if more inferential procedures from the same strategy \mathcal{T} conclude Θ_i with x .

Theorem 4.2 (informativeness). If the data x is more informative than x' about Θ_i with respect to \mathcal{T} for some $i \in \{0, 1\}$, then for all $\Theta \in \Theta$,

$$W(\Theta; T(x) = \Theta_i) \geq W(\Theta; T(x') = \Theta_i).$$

The severity enjoyed by an assertion Θ depends on the design of the inferential strategy \mathcal{T} , rather than the specific inferential procedure derived from it.

Theorem 4.3 (strategic equivalence). For fixed data $x \in \mathcal{X}$, let T_a and $T_{a'}$ be two inferential procedures derived from the inferential strategy \mathcal{T} such that $T_a(x) = T_{a'}(x) = \Theta_i$, where $i \in \{0, 1\}$. Then for all $\Theta \in \Theta$,

$$W(\Theta; T_a(x) = \Theta_i) = W(\Theta; T_{a'}(x) = \Theta_i). \quad (4.2)$$

Theorem 4.4 (subadditivity). For fixed data $x \in \mathcal{X}$, let T_a and $T_{a'}$ be two inferential procedures derived from the inferential strategy \mathcal{T} such that $T_a(x) = \Theta_i$ and $T_{a'}(x) = \overline{\Theta}_i$, where $i \in \{0, 1\}$. Then for all $\Theta \in \Theta$,

$$W(\Theta; T_a(x) = \Theta_i) + W(\Theta; T_{a'}(x) = \overline{\Theta}_i) \leq 1. \quad (4.3)$$

5 Severity in frequentist inference.

Consider a family of tests for the pair of null and alternative hypotheses Θ_0 and Θ_1 , characterized by the collection of rejection regions $\{R(\alpha)\}$, $\alpha \in (0, 1)$. The attained power function is

$$\beta(\theta; x) = P_\theta(X \in R^x) \quad (5.1)$$

where $R^x = \bigcap_{\alpha: x \in R(\alpha)} R(\alpha)$ is the attained rejection region, and $p_x = \sup_{\theta \in \Theta_0} \beta(\theta; x)$ is the p -value of the test.

Corollary 5.1 (severity and p -value). The inferential strategy \mathcal{T} , characterized by critical regions that are rejection regions of a family of hypothesis tests: $C_1(\alpha) = R(\alpha)$, satisfies that for every $T \in \mathcal{T}$,

$$W(\Theta_1; T(x) = \Theta_1) = 1 - p_x,$$

Furthermore, if the attained power function $\beta(\theta; x)$ satisfies $\sup_{\theta \in \Theta_0} \beta(\theta; x) = \inf_{\theta \in \Theta_1} \beta(\theta; x)$ for $x \in \mathcal{X}$, then

$$W(\Theta_0; T(x) = \Theta_0) = p_x.$$

Corollary 5.2 (severity and the attained power function). Suppose $\Theta = \mathbb{R}$, and consider one-sided assertions of interest $\tilde{\Theta}_0 = (-\infty, \tilde{\theta}]$ versus $\tilde{\Theta}_1 = (\tilde{\theta}, \infty)$. If the attained power function $\beta(\theta; x)$ is continuous and monotone increasing in θ for every x , we have that

$$W(\tilde{\Theta}_1; T = \Theta_1) = 1 - \beta(\tilde{\theta}; x), \quad \text{and} \quad W(\tilde{\Theta}_0; T = \Theta_0) = \beta(\tilde{\theta}; x).$$

Remark 5.1. Under the assumption of Corollary 5.2, the attained power function $\beta(\theta; x)$ is a **significance function** [1] (also called the p -value function), which is also a **confidence distribution** [5].

6 Severity in Bayesian inference: an illustration.

Suppose the sampling distribution is $X \sim \text{Bin}(n, \theta)$. Consider

$$\Theta_0: \theta \sim \delta_{(\theta=\frac{1}{2})} \quad \text{versus} \quad \Theta_1: \theta \sim \text{Unif}(0,1).$$

Notice that both Θ_0 and Θ_1 are *singleton* sets. This is the setting that underlies the Lindley's paradox. The marginal likelihood under the two assertions are

$$P(X=x|\Theta_0) = \binom{n}{x} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^n \quad \text{and} \quad P(X=x|\Theta_1) = \int \binom{n}{x} \theta^x (1-\theta)^{n-x} d\theta = \frac{1}{n+1}.$$

Under equal prior probabilities, $P(\Theta_0) = P(\Theta_1) = 0.5$, the Bayes factor

$$BF(x;n) = \frac{P(x|\Theta_0)}{P(x|\Theta_1)} = (n+1) \binom{n}{x} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^n. \quad (6.1)$$

The Bayesian inferential strategy. The Bayesian inferential strategy is to endorse Θ_1 if the attained Bayes factor $BF(x;n)$ falls below a certain pre-determined threshold. This creates critical regions of the form

$$C_1(a) = \left\{ x \in [n] : \left| x - \frac{n}{2} \right| > a \right\}, \quad C_0(a) = \bar{C}_1(a), \quad a \geq 0. \quad (6.2)$$

For illustration, suppose $n=100$ and $x=34$, with a Bayes factor $BF(34;100) = 4.63 \times 10^{-2}$. The attained critical regions for the inferential strategy are

$$C_1^{34} = \{x \leq 34 \text{ or } x \geq 66\} \quad \text{and} \quad C_0^{34} = \{34 \leq x \leq 66\}.$$

Case 1: A ten-fold Bayes factor. Adopt a specific inferential procedure that a Bayes factor less than **0.1** is considered strong evidence towards Θ_1 . This effectively sets $a=14$ in (6.2). The observation $x=34 \in C_1(14)$, and the inferential procedure concludes $T_{14}(x=34) = \Theta_1$. The severity accorded to the inference is

$$W(\Theta_1; T_{14}(34) = \Theta_1) = \inf_{\theta \notin \Theta_1} P_\theta(X \notin C_1^{34}) = \Pr\left(35 \leq X \leq 65 \mid \theta = \frac{1}{2}\right) \doteq 99.89\%,$$

whereas the warrant accorded to the unendorsed claim Θ_0 is

$$W(\Theta_0; T_{14}(34) = \Theta_1) = \inf_{\theta \notin \Theta_0} P_\theta(X \notin C_1^{34}) = \sum_{x=35}^{65} \int \binom{n}{x} \theta^x (1-\theta)^{n-x} d\theta = \frac{31}{101}.$$

Case 2: A hundred-fold Bayes factor. Adopt a more stringent inferential procedure, that only a Bayes factor less than **0.01** would be considered strong evidence towards Θ_1 . This is equivalent to setting $a=18$ in (6.2). The observation $x=34 \in C_0(18)$, and the inferential procedure concludes $T_{18}(x=34) = \Theta_0$, with severity

$$W(\Theta_0; T_{18}(34) = \Theta_0) = \inf_{\theta \notin \Theta_0} P_\theta(X \notin C_0^{34}) = 1 - \sum_{x=34}^{66} \int \binom{n}{x} \theta^x (1-\theta)^{n-x} d\theta = \frac{68}{101},$$

whereas the warrant accorded to the unendorsed claim Θ_1 is

$$W(\Theta_1; T_{18}(34) = \Theta_0) = \inf_{\theta \notin \Theta_1} P_\theta(X \notin C_0^{34}) = \Pr\left(X \leq 33 \text{ or } X \geq 67 \mid \theta = \frac{1}{2}\right) = 0.087\%.$$

Select References

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